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Abstract
This paper considers how the demand for non-material aspects of
jobs evolves over changing wealth levels and how firms may want to
react. We first consider the importance of non-material job aspects in
general before turning to two specific human resource practices: flexi-
ble working hour arrangements and employer pension provision.
In order to estimate the effect of wealth on job preferences without
confounding it with the potential effect of job preferences on wealth
due to earnings differentials, we focus on non-labour income (e.g. lot-
tery winnings). We test how it affects workers’ preferences using an
approach based on duration data.
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Changing job demands
When firms decide on workers’ wages, an important factor is the risk that
too low wages may induce workers to leave. Many factors may determine
the value of a particular job to an individual. A worker who has a higher
wage, enjoys the work she does, has friendly colleagues and flexible working
hours has been found to be less likely to quit. However, the relative weights
of different aspects of employment may vary over time and circumstances.
For example, material aspects may become more important when a worker’s
spouse loses their job and becomes dependent. Similarly, the number of chil-
dren may have an influence on the preferences for certain job characteristics.
With the importance of worker turnover in mind, we may thus be interested
in estimating the effect of different influences on job leaving behaviour. Most
changes in life circumstances are related in complicated ways to individual
behaviour (couples may choose to have a child also as a function of their
expectations of future labour market outcomes), making estimation of the
impact of such changes on preferences for job characteristics difficult.
This paper tests the impact of changes in wealth levels on preferences
over job characteristics. The empirical strategy uses information on windfall
gains (mainly from lottery winnings and inheritances) as an instrument for
wealth changes. These windfalls are expected not to be caused by labour
market behaviour and thus provide an original source of identification for
the effect of wealth on job preferences of workers.
Section one places our research question within the framework of litera-
ture on turnover and job search.
Section two presents a measure of non-material aspects of a job based on
subjective survey data. The single-item measure of job satisfaction for work
“in itself” measures a particular dimension of job satisfaction different from
monetary compensation.
Section three reviews the British household panel data that is used, cov-
ering job durations with information on job characteristics as well as workers’
windfall gains.
Section four first reviews descriptive evidence on job leaving rates across
different groups that appears suggestive of a role for wealth shocks in in-
fluencing job preferences. The empirical model to explain job leaving as a
function of windfalls and job satisfaction is then presented and estimated.
Results confirming an influence of wealth on job preferences are discussed.
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Section five considers which management practices may become more im-
portant as workers become more wealthy: what might managers do to avoid
turnover by workers who become less dependent on the material payoffs of
their job? The impact of working time arrangements and employer pension
fund contributions on changing job leaving is tested.
1 Determinants of Worker Turnover
The current paper considers influences on voluntary turnover decisions by
workers. There is a considerable literature on voluntary turnover, and in
particular on individuals’ motivations for turnover. The classic analysis in
the management field by March and Simon (1958) distinguishes two factors
influencing workers’ mobility decisions: perceived desirability of an individ-
ual’s current employment and perceived ease of movement away from current
employment. Our research question can be framed in these terms as follows:
When ease of movement changes as a result of a wealth shock - e.g. because
individuals have the resources to sustain a transitional search period without
earnings - does perceived desirability become more important?
Turnover research has focused on various dimensions of individual differ-
ences which influence turnover decisions. Personality, gender and industrial
sector have for example been found to be of importance for job leaving (Bar-
rick and Mount (1996)). Wealth differences appear to constitute an impor-
tant difference across individuals. In fact, whilst certain personality traits
(such as the so-called Big Five) are arguably intrinsic, others may be affected
by wealth shocks - e.g. we may expect rising self-confidence. To the extent
that self-confidence is important for job leaving (Barrick and Zimmerman
(2005)), the impact of wealth may pass via self-confidence.
This article is related to a research agenda instigated by Lee and Mitchell
(1994)’s “Unfolding Model” which proposes five determinants of turnover de-
cisions: shocks, scripts (pre-existing leaving plans), image violations (broken
expectations), job satisfaction and job search. These are said to combine to
generate four different turnover path types. In the first path, a shock triggers
a pre-existing plan. If we take wealth as the shock, it may be hypothesized
that workers with lower job satisfaction may be more likely to have pre-
existing plans to leave. In path two, shocks lead workers to reconsider their
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situation. They then leave only after a period of deliberation. The value of
duration models is to not restrict the period over which we allow the shock
to operate. Instead of looking at the impact of a wealth shock for turnover
decisions in the following month or year, we consider the impact over the
whole length of tenure. The hypothesis of this paper is that a re-evaluation
of a worker’s situation after a wealth shock will include, in particular, their
level of job satisfaction. Compared with path two, path three concerns those
individuals that leave for another job - i.e. after assessing alternative options.
To the extent that we cover voluntary turnover both to unemployment and
to alternative employment, we cover this type also. Path four is defined as
a path where lower job satisfaction independent of the shock is the “precipi-
tating” factor of movement.
The idea of the current work is to test whether by changing the relative
importance of monetary and non-monetary job components, wealth shocks
lead to a re-evaluation of jobs’ desirability in terms of job satisfaction. If
this is the case, wealth and job satisfaction interact to determine turnover
outcomes. It appears that this is consistent with paths one to three - which
we will not attempt to distinguish in the empirical part. The approach re-
sembles that of a study by Holtom et al. (2006)1 who compare the degree of
job embeddedness (a concept related to individuals’ attitude towards their
employer) compared across stayers and leavers, distinguishing between shock
leavers and non-shock leavers. The duration data model that we use con-
trasts durations of individuals before and after receiving a shock and over
different levels of job satisfaction.
In a recent paper, Lee et al. (2008) show that job satisfaction has a strong
impact on voluntary job leaving for workers in a variety of situations: Work-
ers leaving to search for a new job; workers leaving to accept a solicited or
unsolicited job offer as well as workers leaving for family reasons. Testing
the relative importance of “push” versus “pull” factors, they also find that
unemployment is not a significant factor in voluntary job leaving decisions.
In economics, turnover has mainly been considered under the prism of
job search theory, in which the informational frictions in the labour market
are modelled using a stochastic job offer arrival rate which individuals can
sometimes influence by adjusting their search effort. One of the results of
simple job search models is that workers’ best strategy for on-the-job search
1Cited by Holtom et al. (2008)
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is simply to compare the utility of their current job to the level of utility
in an alternative job. Thus a many-period game with potentially complex
dynamics has a simple static solution, this is the insight famously used in
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). 2
A requirement for this kind of enlightened job choice is that individuals
are aware of the different levels of utility associated with a job (the salary,
but also the non-monetary component) - for their current job and for any
job offers. To test whether this is the case, Gielen (2008) looks at workers’
job-to-job transitions using the same data analysed here and finds that only
a limited amount of movements can be explained by information-gathering,
whilst many more moves are consistent with informed workers choosing jobs
with higher levels of utility.
Informed transitions provide the basis for our treatment here. It is as-
sumed that jobs consist of a monetary and a non-monetary component -
and that the utility of the non-monetary component is adequately measured
by answers relating to “job satisfaction for work in itself”. We now turn to
this two-dimensional measure of jobs and consider whether such a simple
characterisation of individuals’ appreciation of working conditions can be
justified.
2 Job Satisfaction: domains and measurement
Job satisfaction is a multi-facetted concept for which psychologists have elab-
orated sophisticated models. This paper investigates how a wealth shock
may change the relative importance of non-monetary aspects of jobs. Non-
monetary job aspects are not always easy to observe. As a measure for
non-monetary aspects of the job we require something that workers evaluate
independently of their wages. We might consider subjective job satisfaction,
i.e. answers to the question “How satisfied are you with your job?”. However,
if we assume that evaluations of overall job satisfaction include both job sat-
isfaction with pay as well as job satisfaction with non-monetary aspects of a
job, it is clear that this single-item measure of overall job satisfaction cannot
be used. We require a measure only of the non-monetary element of job sat-
isfaction. However, it is clear that we cannot test the potential independence
2It is only when more sophisticated considerations such as using offers as bargaining
chips (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)) are taken into account that more compli-
cated dynamic strategies are generated.
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by testing the correlation between a measure of non-monetary job charac-
teristics with wages: If it is the case that wealth influences the demand for
non-monetary job characteristics, incomes will also influence this demand
by changing wealth levels. Then we would suspect a correlation between
non-monetary job satisfaction and wages in the absence of any problem in
our measure of non-monetary job aspects.
It may be thought that our requirements for a measure of non-monetary
job characteristics independent of wage are difficult to be met for another
reason: Tenets of perfect markets may argue that wages should be expected
to compensate for differences in the quality of non-monetary job aspects.
This would lead to pay levels being set according to job disamenities as
Adam Smith already predicted (the classic modern exposition is by Rosen
(1986)). However, in line with the vast literature on job search, we only
need to acknowledge the lack of perfect information on the job market in
order to avoid the prediction of a deterministic relationship of job amenities
and wages (see in particular Hwang et al. (1998)). As long as there is some
stochastic variation in the relationship between our measure of job charac-
teristics and wages - which job search models would, for example, predict -
we can use this to identify the effect we are interested in.
The measure that appears to fit rather well the requirements is “job
satisfaction for work in itself”: clearly directed at a subjective evaluation
of intrinsic characteristics of the workplace whilst at the same time clearly
distinct from financial rewards3. Thus the present study uses this one di-
mension of job satisfaction (job satisfaction for work “in itself”) as a measure
for workers’ appreciation of all non-monetary aspects of a job. The other
element assumed to be important in the eyes of workers is the wage. These
two components entirely describe a workplace4.
In the large panel data used for this research, several subjective mea-
sures of domain job satisfaction are available: In particular, table (1) gives
3It may serve as a useful instrument even if this measure does not give a complete
characterisation of relevant job characteristics - it may for example abstract from contex-
tual or relational aspects (e.g. relationships with superiors etc.). Furthermore, we may
be concerned about relying on a single-item measure. Considering job satisfaction overall
- i.e. not the specific domain satisfaction we use - Wanous et al. (1997) discuss to what
extent the summary single-item measure is correlated to more sophisticated measurements
of job satisfaction and conclude on an optimistic note.
4Given that numerous sector and individual dummies are added in the regression anal-
ysis, the identifying assumptions in the empirical part are in fact less restrictive.
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Table 1: Measures of Job satisfaction
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Job Satisfaction overall 5.182 1.363 1 7
Satisfaction with pay 4.829 1.794 1 7
Satisfaction with job security 5.315 1.552 1 7
Satisfaction with work in itself 5.289 1.371 1 7
Satisfaction with working hours 5.088 1.427 1 7
The precise question was: “I’m going to read out a list of various aspects of jobs, and after
each one I’d like you to tell me from this card which number best describes how satisfied or
dissatisfied you are with that particular aspect of your own present job.” The scale (on the
card) varies from “1- Not satisfied” over “4-Not Satisfied, not dissatisfied” to “7-Completely
Satisfied”.
the different measures of subjective job satisfaction for the period under con-
sideration we have information on. We do not need to make assumptions
about the links between objective job characteristics (other than wages) and
the subjective evaluation of non-monetary job satisfaction. However, in this
article, job quality, job characteristics, job satisfaction and working condi-
tions are used interchangeably: our subjective measure is considered to be
a sufficiently good instrument for some objective characteristics. We do not
require that individuals have the same attitudes towards these characteristics
- the same work may be viewed as in itself very satisfying by one person and
not by another. In order to test whether wealth shocks lead to more impor-
tance given to these considerations we need attitudes to be stable across time
however. Whilst the subjective nature of the instrument may mean it varies
not just across individuals but over time, numerous studies have confirmed
the strong correlations between this subjective measure and later objective
outcomes: the fact that job satisfaction predicts future job turnover rates
is an illustration of the possibilities afforded by this measure and ensures a
degree of stability over time. Early papers to note this fact are Hamermesh
(1977) and Freeman (1978). Using subjective data on job satisfaction, Clark
(2001) shows that data on job satisfaction predict quitting behaviour in the
UK, and that it can be used to establish “what matters most in a job”. Using
the same data used in the present study he finds that of the different domain
satisfaction measures of table (1), job security and pay are the most impor-
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tant, followed by work in itself and hours of work. Overall job satisfaction is
found to be a good predictor of future separations. Clark et al. (1998) find
that dissatisfied German workers, too, are more likely to quit.
In what follows we will use job satisfaction, job quality and working con-
ditions interchangeably for only one aspect of job satisfaction - our measure
of the non-material aspects of a job, i.e. job satisfaction for work “in itself”.
3 The British Household Panel Survey
We use the British Household Panel Survey, a panel of around 10,000 per-
sons broadly representative of the British population covered over 17 yearly
waves from 1991 onwards.
The main variables of interest are windfalls, subjective job satisfaction,
job duration and wages, as well as demographic and firm control variables.
Job market data falls into two categories: In every wave, workers are first
asked about the characteristics of their current job, including their subjective
evaluation of working conditions and detailed information on earnings. Sec-
ond, they are asked about transitions within their firm (e.g. promotions) and
across firms (changes of employer or labour market status) in the preceding
year. Our sample thus combines information on wages, working conditions
and job durations.
3.1 The Sample
We focus on employed individuals for whom we have multiple observations
who encounter at least one windfall during the panel observation period.
For this subsample we have information on 10386 completed job spells from
3488 workers. Given the specific factors involved in choosing retirement, the
sample is restricted to those aged between 16 and 50, with a sample average
age of 34 years. The sample is 49% female, 51% are married and the average
level of education is around 12 years. 2% of the male and 30% of the female
sample work part time.
3.2 Windfalls
Windfall earnings are recorded from lottery winnings, gambling gains, inher-
itances, life insurance and accident payouts and money received as a result of
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building society conversion 5. The assumption made here is that these wind-
falls were not anticipated such that no behavioural changes can be made prior
to the windfall. We have no information on the exact date of the windfall,
and assume that the windfall occurred at the beginning of an observation
period (between two waves). If a worker reports having received a windfall
in the preceding period and also reports job mobility, we thus assume that
the windfall occurred before the mobility decision. This assumption ensures
that windfalls are not anticipated as a result of our recording scheme.
Consider the worker in figure (1): In September 2002 she reports having
received a windfall in the previous year. Since the timing of this windfall is
unclear, we do not know whether it occurred before or after January 2002
- i.e. before or after the job change. We assume that the windfall occurred
prior to January 2002. To the extent that windfalls are received later, any
effects of windfalls will occur in later waves - i.e. we can test for lagged
effects in later waves.
We focus on respondents who record some windfall earnings over the pe-
riod of the panel. The majority of windfalls involves small amounts, with a
large spike of £100 6 and a majority of this results from lottery winnings,
gambling and inheritances. Whereas lottery winnings tend to be small, with
a recorded mean of £150, accident (£237) and life insurance (£584), but
especially inheritances (£2294) are larger, as table (2) shows. Whilst most
windfalls appear fairly small compared to earnings, table (4) shows that 5%
of windfalls exceed annual earnings of workers.
3.3 Job duration data
The measure of job duration used here is firm tenure, such that within-firm
mobility does not constitute job leaving. The advantage of considering total
5This is somewhat of a British peculiarity: After the financial Big Bang of the early
1990s a number of building societies (basically consumer cooperatives) demutualised to
become banks. In the process, considerable windfalls were distributed to customers. The
deregulation of the banking sector was a sudden policy change making it very likely that
these earnings qualify as windfalls. There was some speculative behaviour (joining building
societies in the hope of demutualisation), but often clauses were enacted to avoid payouts
to recently joined-up members.
6All monetary values provided are deflated to their values in 2000. For building so-
ciety conversion earnings we have no information on windfall size - payouts here varied
considerably.
8 Luke Haywood
Changing job demands
Table 2: Size of windfalls received
Inherit. Lottery Life ins. Accident ins. Total
1-1000 pounds 98 2255 50 41 2695
1000-5000 pounds 158 78 198 148 627
5000-10000 pounds 79 8 32 23 149
10000-50000 pounds 115 2 42 11 183
50000+ pounds 35 1 5 1 49
Note: For one year (wave 5) only aggregated data are available - included in total.
Table 3: Size of Windfalls as fraction of annual earnings
Inherit. Lottery Life ins. Accident ins. Total
1-10% of annual income 141 2264 78 61 2,788
10-50% of annual income 153 69 184 122 578
50-100% of annual income 67 8 29 29 139
100+% of annual income 124 3 36 12 198
Note: For one year (wave 5) only aggregated data are available - included in total.
duration of a worker with a particular firm rather than in a particular job
position is that within-firm mobility includes promotions which are most cer-
tainly endogenous to workers’ behaviour7. As a result, there may be some
fluctuation in the wages and working conditions within a job (as workers
change jobs within a firm). This appears acceptable given our estimation
strategy (focussing on differential quitting rates) if we use information on
the last available wage and working conditions before a worker left a job. In
the rest of the paper we refer to movements of workers away from employ-
ment at a certain firm as job leaving.
As an example, consider the timeline of a worker depicted in figure (1).
She is observed in the survey interview at wave 11 as being employed at
a certain employer and provides information on job satisfaction, working
conditions etc. In wave 12 she reports having changed employment in the
previous year and provides information on working conditions and earnings
at her new employer. Since the worker provides the exact end date of the
job, we have precise information on job duration. For the job up to January
2002 we assume the covariates provided in September 2001 apply, for the
7In practice, results did not seem very sensitive to using alternative definitions of spells
as job or firm tenure.
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Figure 1: Example of timeline of survey interviews and events
Sep 2001
survey interview wave 11
(job sat., wage, no windfall,...)
Jan 2002
starts new job
Sep 2002
survey interview wave 12
(job sat., wage, windfall,...)
job from January 2002 onwards we assume it is characterised by wage and
working conditions reported in wave 12 (first interview reporting the new
job). Thus we only assume that working conditions remain constant from
the time of the last interview until movement away from the job. This also
means that we cannot use spells for which we have no corresponding survey
information - this is the case of the worker in figure (2) for whom we have
no information on the job between January and April 2002.
3.4 Stock sampling
In our estimation we must control for the fact that we are more likely to
have all the information we require for spells that last longer. In the exam-
ple outlined in figure (2), whilst the job spell from April 2002 onwards is
observed, the spell from January to April 2002 is not observed. We condi-
tion job duration (tenure) at date of entry into the sample to control for the
likelihood of observing an observation - the likelihood of a job lasting until
the interview date.
We exclude individuals for whom we only have one spell in order to in-
crease the efficiency of estimation 8. We have on average 2.8 job observations
per individual.
3.5 Censoring
As in most duration data sets, we do not observe the spell end date for all
individuals. The typical assumption made is that of random censoring, i.e.
8van den Berg (2001) shows that shared frailty models (random effects models with
several observations per individual) offer considerable advantages over models with only
one observation per individual.
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Figure 2: Example of timeline of survey interviews and events
Sep 2001
survey interview wave 11
(job sat., wage, no windfall,...)
Jan 2002
starts new job
April 2002
starts new job
Sep 2002
survey interview wave 12
(job sat., wage, windfall,...)
that those individuals who are censored do not have different characteristics
than those for whom we observe spell end dates.
Censoring may be a particular issue if we have no end dates for the longest
spells which may be ongoing. In our data this concerns very few spells as
there is considerable mobility in the British labour market over the period
studied. Many more spells are censored as individuals drop out of the panel
for unknown reasons. For these we assume random censoring.
3.6 Transitions
All labour market transitions may be affected by the change in wealth. In
particular, we may wish to distinguish transitions within the labour market
from transitions to non-participation. We observe voluntary transitions to
another job, to university, retirements and jobs ending for family reasons as
well as involuntary transitions - redundancies, sacking or ending of part-time
jobs. In order to keep sample sizes reasonable, we do not differentiate be-
tween different transitions in a competing risk framework. Rather, we focus
on all voluntary transitions - excluding all different types of dismissal, re-
dundancy and retirement.
3.7 Job Satisfaction
The measure used for non-monetary job characteristics is the answer to the
question “How satisfied are you with your job in itself ?”, with potential an-
swers ranging from “1 - not at all satisfied” to “7 - completely satisfied”. The
presence of other questions relating specifically to satisfaction with financial
rewards should reassure us that the dimension of job quality measured here
relates exclusively to factors other than remuneration, as the empirical strat-
egy requires. Table (1) provides information about different measures of job
satisfaction.
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Table 4: Destinations of job leavers
number of spells percent
to new job 1985 16.47
to unemployment 1107 9.19
to university 83 0.69
retirement 24 0.20
family-related 229 1.90
health-related 170 1.41
other 1512 12.55
censored 6940 57.59
total 12050 100
4 Empirical Analysis
Descriptive evidence of the impact of wealth shocks on transition behaviour
is presented in figures (3) and (4) which give the smoothed hazard rate
and the survival rates by receipt of a large windfall (defined as a windfall
greater than £2000) and by job satisfaction (high job satisfaction defined as
“nearly completely” or “completely satisfied” workers), focussing on the first
100 months of a job.
We find that quit rates are highest for the group of workers with low job
satisfaction and windfalls (maybe a call centre lottery winner) and lowest
(over most of the job duration) for workers with high job satisfaction and
windfalls (e.g. an artist lottery winner who can continue her low-paid job).
This variation in the impact of wealth shocks on mobility decisions over dif-
ferent levels of job satisfaction provides a starting point for a more rigorous
causal analysis.
4.1 The Cox Proportional Hazard model
In order to map the factors influencing job leaving, we focus on the hazard
rate, a measure of the duration distribution. The hazard at time t is the
probability of job leaving conditional on having stayed in a job spell s up
until t. Because it is thought that for many dynamic processes, the duration
12 Luke Haywood
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Figure 3: Moving to another job: by Windfall and Job Satisfaction
Large windfall here defined as windfall greater than £2000
t is itself a factor determining the rate of exit out of a state (here, an em-
ployment), researchers typically distinguish between a baseline hazard θ0(t)
depending on duration and a systemic part of the hazard θ1(x) which gives
the influence of the covariates. A simplifying assumption many researchers
make is that the two parts are multiplicatively separable, generating the
proportional hazard model. The implications of the resulting formulation
(1) is that the covariates - amongst others here income and job satisfaction
- have a proportionally constant influence on the hazard rate over different
job durations.
In order to take into account potential differences across individuals that
are not covered by observables x, an individual effect for unobserved hetero-
geneity ηi(s) is added in (1).
θs(ts|xs) = θ0(ts) exp(x′sβ + ηi(s)) (1)
Or, defining ξi = exp(ηi):
θs(ts|xs) = θ0(ts) θ1(xs) ξi(s) (2)
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Figure 4: Staying in a job: by Windfall and Job Satisfaction
Large windfall here defined as windfall greater than £2000
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The Cox Proportional hazard model (CPH) allows for many types of
different functions for duration dependence θ0(t) - in fact any multiplicative
time-dependent baseline hazard rates are acceptable. The procedure is semi-
parametric in the sense that the baseline (unobserved) hazard (θ0 in (1)) is
not estimated and the partial likelihood estimates of the coefficients (β) are
nonetheless consistent. The intuition for the partial likelihood is - for a spell
s - to use the conditional probability that spell s ends, given risk set Rs
defined as the set of spells ending at or after s. Due to the proportionality
assumption, the baseline hazard - assumed to be the same for all individuals
- drops out.
Thus we write the partial likelihood conditional on the individual effects
as:
LPLs (β|ts=1...S , xs=1...S) =
s=S∏
s=1
θ1(xs) ξi(s)∑
r∈Rs θ1(xr)ξi(r)
(3)
The CPH model buys semiparametric identification at the cost of effi-
ciency: Only the ordering of job durations influences the likelihood, not the
precise timing - so not all information is used for estimation.
For ξ we here follow a parametric route and assume ξ D→ Gamma. The
gamma distribution is not only a flexible distribution but it has also been
shown that very general random processes can be well approximated by this
distribution (Abbring and van den Berg (2007)). Multiple observations per
individual somewhat weaken the strong assumptions on orthogonality be-
tween random effects and other explanatory variables (van den Berg (2001)).
For the individual likelihood contribution this implies integrating out the in-
dividual effect:
Li(β|ts=1...S(i), xs=1...S(i)) =
s=S(i)∏
s=1
∫ ∞
−∞
θ1(xs) ξi(s)∑
r∈Rs θ1(xr)ξi(r)
dGξ (4)
4.2 Changing importance of job satisfaction
Our empirical analysis looks into the evolution of two key job characteristics
hypothesized to influence job leaving decisions: the wage and job satisfac-
tion for work in itself. In line with previous research, both are found to have
a strongly significant impact on individuals’ job mobility choices. The re-
gressions control for individual characteristics (age (non-linearly), education
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(non-linearly), family situation (4 dummies)), objective working conditions
(part-time (dummy), working hours), as well as 13 sector dummies thought
to be potentially related to working conditions. The dependent variable in
regressions is the hazard rate, i.e. the probability of job leaving at any point
in time. Using the Cox limited information structure, the models allow for
unspecified types of duration dependency (subject to the proportional haz-
ard assumption). Furthermore, gamma-distributed shared random effects
are included in the model and unobserved heterogeneity in job leaving is
found to be significant.
In line with the initial hypothesis, it is found that the impact of windfalls
on job leaving depends importantly on the level of job satisfaction, i.e. that
the interaction effect is negative, such that the coefficient on job satisfac-
tion becomes larger in absolute terms after a windfall. In table (5) we find
that the interaction is in fact non-linear in the windfall with higher windfalls
showing over-proportionally more impact on the size of the coefficient of job
satisfaction.
To gain an understanding of size and significance of the effects over a
range of windfalls and keeping over covariates constant we do a simulation9
the results of which are presented in figure (5). We investigate the difference
in job leaving of a one-point increase in job satisfaction (from level 6 to 7)
for a 35-year old never married person working full-time 35 hours in the
manufacturing sector earning £12,000 yearly. We find that the marginal
effect starts to become significantly different from the baseline for windfall
values of around £1,000, changing quite significantly for larger windfalls. For
windfalls above £100,000 the precision of the estimates is strongly reduced
as we face small samples.
5 Human Resource Management responses
Employee turnover may carry considerable costs for firms. Whilst estimates
of the precise costs vary a great deal10, one aim of human resource practices
such as flexible working hours or pension contributions may be employee
retention (Houseman (2001)). In the previous section, subjective job satis-
9Ai and Norton (2003) note that the interaction effect in non-linear models is not the
marginal effect we would like to use for interpretation.
10Holtom et al. (2008) cite a range from less than one times a worker’s monthly income
to more than two yearly incomes.
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Table 5: Job leaving as a function of wage and job satisfaction. Model
1 adds log windfalls and interactions in levels; model 2 adds windfalls as
a percentage of annual income and interactions. See the footnote for the
numerous controls included in the regressions. Dependent variable: hazard
rate of voluntary job leaving
Model 1 Model 2
βˆ (robust s.e) βˆ (robust s.e)
Log Wage -0.585*** -0.488***
(0.055) (0.041)
Job Satisfaction -0.099*** -0.089***
(0.017) (0.021)
Log Windfall (LWF) -0.242
(0.321)
Log Windfall squared (LWF2) 0.042
(0.039)
(Job Satisf * LWF) Interaction 0.030**
(0.013)
(Job Satisf * LWF2) Interaction -0.004***
(0.001)
(Log Wage * LWF) Interaction 0.009
(0.034)
(Log Wage * LWF2) Interaction -0.001
(0.004)
Windfall as % annual income (WF/W) 0.006
(0.010)
(Job Satisf * WF/W) Interaction -0.004***
(0.001)
(Log Wage * WF/W) Interaction 0.002
(0.001)
Log Pseudolikelihood -6013.41 -6026.59
Controls: age,age2,education,education2, 13 industry dummies, 4 family situation
dummies, working hours, part-time dummy;
Sample size: N = 3488;N ∗ S = 10386
Significance levels:10%(*),5%(**),1%(***)
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Figure 5:
faction for work “in itself” was used as a measure of working conditions in a
firm. Can we go beyond that and find objective characteristics that might
become more important to workers as a result of the wealth shock? First,
model (2) in table (5) indicates that the impact of a wealth shock depends
importantly on an employee’s level of earnings. In fact the model achieves
a better fit if we express windfalls as a percentage of annual earnings. Thus
changing job preferences are clearly more relevant for less well-paid workers.
Put another way, firms can still retain workers who care more about the
intrinsic job characteristics by paying higher wages.
What else might managers do? We explore two particular practices that
have received some attention in the human resource literature: flexible work-
ing arrangements and whether the employer participates in a private pension
scheme.
5.1 Latent preferences for flexible working hours
Most types of employment contract stipulate not only a given number of
hours, but also the specific schedule when these hours must be worked. This
second constraint might be particularly costly for individuals who have im-
portant family commitments, and in particular, childcare obligations. How
might demand for flexible working hours be affected by changing wealth lev-
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els?
On the one hand, increased levels of wealth should increase demand for
leisure activities, some of which may be difficult to reschedule. More gener-
ally, to the extent that flexible working hours are an immaterial job charac-
teristic we might expect the relative weight of flexibility to have increased
after a wealth shock.
On the other hand, the impact of these “scheduling costs” (Wilson (1989))
may be reduced when childcare provision can be purchased by families. This
might suggest a decrease in the relative importance of flexible working hours
to workers after a wealth shock.
We use a series of questions related to specific working hour arrangements
and generate a dummy for flexible working hours. Jobs for which individ-
uals declare that employers run a scheme of “flexitime”, “annualised hours”,
“job share”, “nine day fortnight” or “zero hours contract” are all classified
as flexible working arrangements. In practice, 85% of the flexible working
hours arrangement concerned flexitime. Whilst flexitime arrangements vary,
workers are in general required to work at “core” times and free to schedule
their working hours around these - subject to a total number of hours being
worked in a given period.
The results in table (6) provide strong evidence that the second effect
dominates: the population is split three times: the two panels on the right
give the estimates for childless individuals and for parents, the middle two
panels for women and men whereas the left two panels compare mothers
to men and childless women. Note that we here focus only on dependent
children, such that parents with grown-up children are here categorised as
childless. The change in preferences after a wealth shock can be assessed
by the interaction term of flexible working hours and the windfall. For a
large windfall the coefficient on flexible working hours is shown to change
significantly - but for certain groups only: for mothers, less strongly for the
group of all women and not significantly for parents (including men) and
men. Given ample evidence that the majority of childcare is still carried
out by mothers this supports the idea that the worker engaging in chlidcare
is the key factor in determining the reduced importance of flexible working
hours after a wealth shock.
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Table 6: Job leaving as a function of wage, windfalls, flexible working hours
and an interaction term. The first two columns on the left compare mothers
to childless women and men; the middle two columns compare coefficients
for men and women and the two columns on the right compare parents to
individuals without dependent children. See the footnote for the numerous
controls included in the regressions. Dependent variable: hazard rate of
voluntary job leaving
Mothers Childless or Men Women Men Childless Parents
βˆ βˆ βˆ βˆ βˆ βˆ
Log Wage -0.561*** -0.691*** -0.711*** -0.616*** -0.835*** 0.549***
(0.198) (0.138) (0.186) (0.173) (0.170) (0.147)
Log Windfall (LWF) 0.142 0.787** 0.118 1.101** 0.770** 0.165
(0.407) (0.343) (0.382) (0.492) (0.389) (0.302)
Flexible Hours (Flex) -0.445*** -0.547 -0.386** 0.068 -0.123 -0.205
(0.173) (0.111) (0.161) (0.139) (0.128) (0.129)
(Flex * LWF) Inter’n 0.138** 0.012 0.125** -0.028 0.020 0.072
(0.055) (0.034) (0.056) (0.043) (0.037) 0.045
Log Pseudolik. -930.523 -3513.079 -1359.321 -2307.101 -2473.244 -1957.831
N*S (spells) 1886 6630 2865 4321 4743 3773
N (individuals) 880 2790 1257 1722 2188 1764
Controls: age,age2,education,education2, 13 industry dummies, 4 family situation
dummies, working hours, part-time dummy;
Significance levels:10%(*),5%(**),1%(***); All standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity
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5.2 Latent preferences for employer pension contributions
Around two-thirds of the employment spells (72%) in our sample are at em-
ployers who run a private pension scheme. Why might preferences regarding
this benefit change as a result of the wealth shock? If individuals who win
a large windfall gain are less focused on the immediate material needs and
more likely to consider long-term perspectives, we may expect an increased
importance of this job characteristic in workers’ transition decisions.
The results in table (7) indicate a significant increase in the importance
of employers’ pension contributions after a wealth shock. When we split the
population by gender we find that this effect is driven by male workers.
How can we interpret this finding? Employer pension contributions can
be described as forced savings: A part of workers’ earnings is saved for the
period after retirement. As workers become more wealthy, this type of ar-
rangement may become more interesting - in particular for those individuals
who manage their spending habits less well. This might fit with evidence
showing that women are more risk-averse. However, differential savings be-
haviour may also be the result of time-inconsistent preferences such that men
would benefit from the comitment device of forced savings and may show a
stronger revealed preference for employer pension contributions11.
6 Concluding remarks
Using British panel data it has been found that the degree to which wealth
influences mobility decisions depends on the degree of job satisfaction in-
dividuals have in a particular job. The way in which the labour market
distributes utility may depend importantly not only on human capital and
luck (as models of the labour market focussing on productivity and frictions
imply) but also on non-human capital. The basic finding should be relevant
to a number of researchers interested in the interactions between inequal-
ity, unearned income and subjective wellbeing in the labour market. It also
holds lessons for managers who might be confronted with workers whose high
motivation to work may be related to the monetary dimension of their job
and thus susceptible to decrease over time as workers accumulate wealth.
Whilst the current paper focuses on wealth shocks, further research is called
for regarding the rôle of job quality in mobility decisions in a model allowing
11See Sunden and Surette (1998) for a US perspective on gender differences in savings.
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Table 7: Job leaving as a function of wage, windfalls, employer pension
contributions and an interaction term. The two columns compare coefficients
for men and women. See the footnote for the numerous controls included in
the regressions. Dependent variable: hazard rate of voluntary job leaving
Sample Women Men
βˆ βˆ βˆ
Log Wage -0.587*** -0.644*** -0.640***
(0.084) (0.120) (0.125)
Log Windfall (LWF) 0.102*** 0.065* 0.138***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.037)
Employer Pension Contributions (Pension) -0.579*** -0.592*** -0.488***
(0.087) (0.122) (0.126)
(LWF * Pension) Interaction -0.056** -0.030 -0.086**
(0.028) (0.037) (0.041)
Log Pseudolik. -5904.664 -2874.462 -3007.754
N*S (spells) 10207 5078 5129
N (individuals) 3485 1718 1767
Controls: age,age2,education,education2, 13 industry dummies, 4 family situation
dummies, working hours, part-time dummy;
Significance levels:10%(*),5%(**),1%(***); All standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity
for wealth accumulation.
Different potential HRM responses have been outlined here. Behavioural
changes in preferences over job characteristics were found to be a function
not only of the absolute size of windfalls but of windfalls relative to cur-
rent income. For a given windfall, individuals with lower incomes will thus
be more strongly influenced by the arguments advanced here. Consistent
with the efficiency wage literature this underlines the strong importance of
earnings on job mobility decisions and provides a first potential managerial
response.
Whilst subjective job satisfaction is known to be related to objective
working conditions in numerous ways, the shift in preferences for job sat-
isfaction was found to go hand in hand with a shift in preferences for two
objective job characteristics: whether an employer offers flexible working ar-
rangements and whether an employer participates in an employer pension
scheme. We have seen how changing wealth levels impact job demands by
workers and considered potential HRM responses: Wealthier workers are less
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interested in flexible working arrangements and more interested in employer
pension contributions.
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